I do not believe free proxies can completely conceal my IP. What kind of proxy is the most effective at completely blocking my IP from computer experts working for police departments, and has a changable IP, so a new one does not have to be purchased? Can I buy a proxy as software at a store?

https://www.torproject.org/download.html.en
http://anon.inf.tu-dresden.de/index_en.html

By the way, no proxy is 100%. The point is to make it extremely difficult for them to find you. I use either of the programs above and set it's proxy settings to point to the other program. Usually JAP to tor.

Actually, free proxies are far more effective than pay-per-use proxies, as you have a money trail linking you to one of them. It isn't the gratis one.

Use Tor: The onion router (http://torproject.org) for maximum anonymity. It's probably your best option. JAP (or Jondo) is completely backdoored, and Xerobank is snake oil. Tor is the de facto standard, and with a good hardened configuration, you can be assured of near-total anonymity.

You can check the sticky for how to set up IM and web browsing programs to use Tor, in my howto.

Xerobank is snake oil, but how it JAP backdoored? I heard this from anywhere.

Xerobank is snake oil, but how it JAP backdoored? I heard this from anywhere.

It is literally backdoored by the german police. They are forced to keep logs which will compromise anonymity.

It is literally backdoored by the german police. They are forced to keep logs which will compromise anonymity.

So theoretically, in order to obfuscate an end-node attack with tor, I'm fine with configuring JAP to use tor as a proxy, or just not use JAP at all?

So theoretically, in order to obfuscate an end-node attack with tor, I'm fine with configuring JAP to use tor as a proxy, or just not use JAP at all?

"end-node attack"? Meaning what? You're concerned about the exit node sniffing?

Well here's some news for you. If your traffic is not 1.) fully anonymized in terms of content (no signing your name to those "anonymous" communiques) or 2.) end-to-end encrypted (like ssh or https), you are fucked. The best thing to do is assume every node on every network is sniffing everything and plan accordingly.

How do you solve having a to wait 5 minutes for each page to load with tor?

You realize that latency is the price you pay for anonymity. Or, you just bareback it, and get Fed aids.

I've had no problem bare backing it....

Takes me 15-30 seconds.

I've always been curious as to how a socks proxy chain can be compromised. Theoretically every server you use would have to be subpoenaed and their logs analyzed, no? And if you use socks from a bunch of different and unfriendly countries it seems like that can almost guaranteed not to happen.

Am I missing something? And don't most socks not keep logs anyways?

I've had no problem bare backing it....

You don't use any protection...?

-F☺rd

You realize that latency is the price you pay for anonymity. Or, you just bareback it, and get Fed aids.

lolololol. what what in the butt

"end-node attack"? Meaning what? You're concerned about the exit node sniffing?

Well here's some news for you. If your traffic is not 1.) fully anonymized in terms of content (no signing your name to those "anonymous" communiques) or 2.) end-to-end encrypted (like ssh or https), you are fucked. The best thing to do is assume every node on every network is sniffing everything and plan accordingly.

Yes, exit node sniffing. That's the term I was looking for. :P

So you're implying that tor is only good so long as you are connected to a secure server? Most of the web doesn't have https.

Yes, exit node sniffing. That's the term I was looking for. :P

So you're implying that tor is only good so long as you are connected to a secure server? Most of the web doesn't have https.

It depends what you're sending to the website. You're obviously still anonymous, but if you send your name and phone number in cleartext, the exit node can read it. If you're just browsing totse, (you can use https but) the exit node will know you read totse but not who you are. If you're just on wikipedia and you (log in using the secure server or) don't log in, the exit node will know you're reading wikipedia, but not who you are.

Most websites do have https, especially those that want logins to be secured. If you aren't sending any information, you don't need to worry about the exit node (unless you're downloading something that identifies who you are).

Note also that if Tor notices that the website you are connecting to runs a Tor node, it will automatically extend the circuit another hop and exit on localhost on the server. This will give you a secure, end-to-end encrypted connection even if the site uses a cleartext protocol like http.

YET, you crazy bastard.

Note also that if Tor notices that the website you are connecting to runs a Tor node, it will automatically extend the circuit another hop and exit on localhost on the server. This will give you a secure, end-to-end encrypted connection even if the site uses a cleartext protocol like http.

That's actually really cool

That's actually really cool

Privacy-enhancing technology is always cool.