Anselm's Argument may be summarized thus:

1. God is, by definition, a being greater than anything that can be imagined.
2. Existence in both reality and imagination is greater than existence solely in one's imagination.
3. Therefore, God must exist in reality; if God did not, then God would not be a being greater than anything that can be imagined.


I don't really see how this shows anything. Can anyone explain it/ got any counter arguments?

I don't really see how this shows anything. Can anyone explain it/ got any counter arguments?

The man found God, began to understand a major paradox, and tried to put a logical impossibility that somehow is true into the frame of logical description. A failed attempt at a proof...really. <-an explanation of it

I can't imagine 'nothing'...it is greater than what I can imagine. However, I can imagine reflections of 'nothingness', such as empty space (this would be akin to the view one holds of God within their imagination...it's a reflection of God, but not really God). But this ability to imagine things close to 'nothing', and 'nothing' superseding the abilities of the imagination, does not necessitate 'nothing' in reality. <-that is an argument against it.

I don't really see how this shows anything. Can anyone explain it/ got any counter arguments?
He's saying that a God who exists is greater than a God who doesn't, and since the concept of "God" includes the idea of ultimate greatness he must exist.

The problem is that the idea of an existent God is already "encoded" in the idea of God (you don't imagine a nonexistent entity when you imagine it - to imagine it, you give it existence in order to consider it); the challenge isn't between a nonexistent God and an existent one, but between the idea of an existent God and the idea of a nonexistent God. Clearly, the existent God is more powerful - but only in the realm of ideas. It doesn't mean he/she/it is actually existing.

Here's (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/) a better explanation. I quote a very relevant passage:
We start with the claim that the Fool understands the expression "being than which no greater can be conceived", i.e., even the Fool can entertain the idea or possess the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived. Now, entertaining this idea or possessing this concept requires the entertainer or possessor to recognise certain relationships which hold between given properties and the idea or concept in question. For example, given that you possess the concept of, or entertain the idea of, a smallest really existent Martian, it follows that you must recognise some kind of connection between the properties of being a Martian, really existing, and being smaller than other really existing Martians, and the concept or idea in question.

Following Anselm, we might say that, since you understand the expression "smallest really existent Martian", there is, in your understanding, at least one smallest really existent Martian. (Or, apparently following Descartes, one might say that real existence is "part of" — or "contained in" — the idea of a smallest really existent Martian.) However, in saying this, it must be understood that we are not actually predicating properties of anything: we aren't supposing that there is something which possesses the properties of being a Martian, really existing, and being no larger than any other Martian. (After all, we can safely suppose, we don't think that any Martians really exist.) In other words, we must be able to have the concept of, or entertain the idea of, a smallest really existing Martian without believing that there really are any smallest Martians. Indeed, more strongly, we must be able to entertain the concept of a smallest really existent Martian — and to recognise that the property of "really existing" is part of this concept — while nonetheless maintaining that there are no smallest existent Martians.

It will be useful to introduce vocabulary to mark the point which is being made here. We could, for instance, distinguish between the properties which are encoded in an idea or concept, and the properties which are attributed in positive atomic beliefs which have that idea or concept as an ingredient. The idea "really existent Santa Claus" encodes the property of real existence; but it is perfectly possible to entertain this idea without attributing real existence to Santa Claus, i.e., without believing that Santa Claus really exists.

Hope this helps. :) The argument caused great difficulty for me for a long while.

^Thanks both of you. I kind of understand what its on about now, and where it falls down.

Cheers